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OFFICER ENUNCIATING GROUNDS FOR EXPERT 
OPINION THAT A DRIVER WAS GROSSLY 
INTOXICATED - CORRECTNESS OF COURT 
CONVICTING ON SUCH EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. FISET- BC Supreme Court, Prince George 27652, September 1994. 
The accused was stopped in a roadblock. The officer noticed nothing out of order 
except bloodshot eyes. The accused explained to be very tired. Due to a strong smell 
from the dog the accused had in the cab of his pick-up truck, the officer did not detect 
any odours associated with alcohol. Immediately upon allowing the accused to drive 
on, the officer received information from a motorist that caused her to pursue the 
accused and pull him over. There was not anything wrong with his driving or the way 
he handled his documents. However, when the accused stepped out of his truck she 
could see that he was grossly intoxicated. All the signs and symptoms were blatantly 
there and the officer decided that any tests were superfluous. 
At his trial for impaired driving the officer described the accused's condition in great 
detail and expressed the expert opinion that the accused was very and grossly 
intoxicated and impaired to drive. The trial judge accepted that evidence as proof of a 
fact, and convicted the accused. He appealed this verdict to the Supreme Court of BC 
claiming that the guilty verdict was unreasonable and could not be supported by the 
evidence which was exclusively the officer's opinion. 
The Supreme Court held that upon the evidence as it was adduced in this case, the trial 
judge had reasonably and properly drawn the irresistible inference that the accused 
was guilty as charged. 
Appeal Dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
1 
2 
CRIMINAL CODE WARRANT FOR THEFT OF ELECTRICITY 
EXECUTED BY DRUG SQUAD ALLEGEDLY TO FIND 
GROUNDS FOR A N.C.A. WARRANT 
REGINA v. DAIGLE - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA 017376, September, 
1994. 
A BC Hydro worker attended the accused's home to disconnect the powerline for non-
payment of power used. The worker noticed a power by-pass so power to the house 
would not be metered. BC Hydro security was alerted and they in tum called the police. 
All these personnel would be pretty naive if they did not know that 80% of by-passes of 
this kind are for the purpose of excessive power consuming hydroponics growing of 
marijuana plants. The police officer in attendance obtained a Criminal Code warrant to 
search and seize any equipment used to steal power and any used in the consumption 
of that stolen power. 
Of the eight police officers who executed the Criminal Code warrant four were assigned 
to the drug squad. The accused was immediately arrested for theft of electricity and 
taken away from the scene. One of the drug squad officers entered a downstairs room, 
saw marijuana plants, closed the door and left the house. Then the drug squad people 
obtained a warrant under the Narcotic Control Act (s. 12) and executed it, seizing 90 
marijuana plants. 
The accused was convicted of cultivating and possessing marijuana. The latter charge 
was for the purpose of trafficking. He appealed his conviction and argued that the 
search was unreasonable. The police had not come to search for evidence to support 
a charge of theft of electricity. They came to search for narcotics. The whole police 
process was nothing more than a ruse and guise to search for narcotics with a "theft of 
electricity" warrant. When they found what they were looking for, then they got the 
necessary warrant to seize the contraband. In essence the defence argued that it 
amounted to a charade that amounted to an abuse of what .the process should be. This 
caused the search as well as the seizure unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter. The 
trial judge had held that the search and seizure had not been unreasonable and had 
admitted the evidence. Needless to say, much was made of the presence of four drug 
squad personnel to corroborate the police's real objective. 
The defence brought a similar case 1 to the Court's attention where police armed with a 
"stolen property" warrant came with 7 officers to execute it. Several of these officers 
were from the drug squad and their objective was not silverware but cocaine. The 
accused in that case immediately showed the officers the items of silverware mentioned 
1 Regina v. Hoy and Penso - New Westminster 29373, 1992. 
3 
in the warrant. However, police continued to search and found cocaine. That search 
was unreasonable and the cocaine inadmissible in evidence. 
The BC Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that his case was distinguishable 
from the one where police had a warrant for a rare set of silverware. In that case the 
warrant was exhausted as soon as the police were shown the set. In this case the 
warrant was broader and authorized search and seizure of equipment used for the by-
pass and any apparatus or item used in the consumption of the stolen electricity. The 
warrant authorized things to be searched for that could operate in any part of the 
house. The warrant was not exhausted when the by-pass equipment was found at the 
meter box. 
The warrant was directed to "peace officers in the Province of BC" and all the officers 
were regardless of their assignment. Quoting the Ontario Court of Appeal the BC Court 
of Appeal said: 
"A search does not become unreasonable by reason of anticipation or 
expectation of finding evidence of other offences."2 
This is as much as the Court did say about this issue. It did not allow the defence to 
put forward the manner in which the Criminal Code warrant was executed with the drug 
squad obviously using this warrant to search for narcotics, to show that the search was 
unreasonable. Defence did not raise this particular issue at trial and was consequently 
not entitled to do so on appeal unless it is an exceptional case to balance this interest 
of justice to all parties. 
2 
4 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
Regina v, Annett (1984) 17 C.C.C. (3d) 332. (Leave of appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada 
was refused). 
THE "KNOCK-ON" OR "SNIFF" INVESTIGATIVE 
TECHNIQUE TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE FOR A SEARCH 
WARRANT IN CASES OF CULTIVATING MARIJUANA 
REGINA v. C. EVANS AND R. EVANS - Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver 
CA017104 & CA017105, September, 1994 
An anonymous tipster phoned "Crimestoppers" and said that at a certain address 
marijuana was being cultivated by a man and woman who lived there. She, being 
familiar with the drug market, could smell overwhelmingly the odours of such cultivation. 
Three police officers went to the address and when the door was answered they could 
clearly smell the growing operation. They arrested Robert Evans who had answered 
the door and while securing the house they saw marijuana plants in the home. 
All of this was attested to by one of the officers before a justice and a warrant did issue. 
The execution yielded numerous marijuana plants. 
Robert Evans and Cheryl Evans were jointly charged with: 
1. Cultivating marijuana, and 
2. Possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
The trial judge acquitted the two accused of the cultivation charge as there was no real 
evidence that they conducted the growing operation. The gravamen of the offence of 
cultivation is the exercise of labour and effort to effect the growing process. 
The accused were convicted of possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking. 
The accused appealed this verdict arguing that the marijuana had been found by 
means of an unreasonable search and should not have been admitted in evidence. 
The Court of Appeal for BC held that police attending at someone's door to sniff for tell-
tale odours of growing marijuana constitutes a search. 
There is a proposition in law that there is implied consent to enter on private property to 
"approach" the occupant's front door "whether that person comes to do the household 
good or ill". In as much as a burgler who comes to case the place for a break-in is not 
welcome, neither is the police to the householder who cultivates marijuana. Said the 
Court: 
"It would not be useful and, indeed, might be dangerous to attempt to 
enumerate those occasions upon which the law does give such a licence 
in the absence of a warrant." 
5 
Seemingly critical of the well known Kokesch decision regarding perimetre searches the 
BC Court of Appeal's majority judgment reads: 
"If a peace officer may not go without a warrant, on private property to 
ascertain if the offence of cultivating marijuana is in process, how can he 
or she go on property without a warrant to ascertain if someone has been 
kidnapped and is being held in that place, or if the property is a repository 
for stolen goods? It may be said that without sufficient evidence for a 
warrant to do any such thing. But what if the only basis is an anonymous 
tip?" 
Nearly all cases on this point are warrantless perimetre searches to discover evidence 
of hydroponic cultivation of marijuana.3 Where a warrant was obtained subsequent to a 
warrantless unreasonable.search then the courts must determine if without the 
evidence obtained by that search the warrant is still supportable. In other words, could 
a warrant still issue without the information gained by that pre-warrant search. 
The BC Court of Appeal then did an unusual "critique" as it were of the search 
provisions in the Narcotic Control Act. The Court pointed out that according to s. 12 
NCA the officer who swears to the content of the application for the warrant does not 
require him/her to believe there are reasonable grounds for a search. The test is clearly 
objective - the justice must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds. Then the 
justice must name the officers the warrant does license to conduct the search. 
However, such named officers must have the subjective belief, on reasonable grounds, 
that there are narcotics in the dwelling house (s. 10 NCA). Despite this, all applicants 
for these warrants express their subjective beliefs ("The informant says that he has 
reasonable grounds to believe and does believe that .... ). This, the .Court reasoned 
causes inconsistency or inequality. Subjective beliefs vary from person to person. A 
cautious officer or one who is prepared to leap to conclusions can make a big 
difference. The Court seemed to say that the objective test was deliberately provided 
for in s. 12 to prevent these inequities. The officer swears to the truth of the applieation 
and the justice then assesses the evidence objectivity to determine if a warrant should 
issue. 
The BC Court of Appeal held that the evidence obtained by sniffing at the front door of 
the accused's home was a search and an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the 
Charter. 
3 
6 
R. v .. Kokesch - 61 C.C.C. (3d) 27 - Volume 39, page 6 of this publication. 
R. v. Grant - 84 C.C.C. (3d) 161 - Volume 45, page 1 of this publication. 
R. v. Plant - 84 C.C.C. (3d) 203 - Volume 45, page 7 of this publication 
R. v. Wiley - [1993] 3. S.C.R. 263. 
This left the Court of Appeal for BC to decide if admitting the evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. This was a difficult issue "because the section 
does not say among whom the administration of justice will be brought into disrepute''. 
The mythical standard may be "among right-thinking persons" - but who are they? As it 
is, reasoned the Court, the administration of justice, particularly criminal justice, is not 
held in high regard by the "citizenry". "This is nm because evidence is admitted which 
they would exclude". 
The Court summarized that it is a "troubling proposition" to hold that it is an 
unreasonable search for a policeman to go up to a front door, knock and sniff when the 
door is answered. The "knock on" investigative technique will have to be abandoned 
"at least in instances of suspicion of cultivating marijuana". However, the Court seemed 
to predict that this precedentwill soon apply to all investigations. Said the Court: 
" ..... to what extend, the infringing of constitutional right by going onto 
private property on a suspicion founded only on an anonymous tip will 
impede the police in the investigation of other sorts of crimes, or at least 
impede them in quick, inexpensive investigations, I am unable to predict." 
The BC Court of Appeal held that excluding the marijuana evidence would bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute. Consequently ..... 
Note: 
The appeal was 
dismissed, conviction was 
upheld 
Besides the above "extra comments" (obiter dicta) by the justice who authored this 
majority judgment there were other interesting gratuities that pointed out iniquities. 
Besides sentencing showing a divergent view of the gravity of these types of offences, 
a troubling point was the apparent difference for the rich and the poor in the prosecution 
for them. Is that distinction a consideration under the exclusionary provisions in s. 24 
(2) of the Charter? Will the fact that the poor man can be caught where the rich man 
cannot, shed a disreputal light on our administration of justice? The Justice knew of 
only one offence that could be detected by a "sniff' sufficiently to obtain a search 
warrant. This means that the rich person who can afford privacy in terms of the 
property around his home, will be protected by this decision and those by the Supreme 
Court of Canada. The poor man who lives "cheek-by-jowl" with the sidewalk police can 
"search" by sniffing while standing on public property. 
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The Crown did not appeal the acquittal on cultivating marijuana. The reason given by 
the trial judge for this verdict was the lack of evidence that either of the accused had 
exercised labour or effort to effect the growing of these plants. Said the authoring 
Justice gratuitously: 
"I would not wish to be taken as agreeing with the proposition of law 
inherent in those reasons, even though the proposition has some support 
in authority". 
Simultaneously to this Evans decisions the Court of Appeal for BC released its 
judgment on an appeal by a Douglas H. Peterson (Vancouver CA017187). He was 
also discovered to be cultivating marijuana by means of a "knock on - sniff" method. 
The Court found that his rights had been infringed by this investigative practice and that 
the evidence was obtained by an unreasonable search. However, in the Evans cases 
the Court of Appeal said that due to the ·size of the operation excluding the evidence 
would bring disrepute on the administratiqn of justice. In the Peterson case the Crown 
had not adduced any evidence of the magnitude of his operation. Hence the 
foundation for holding as it did in the Evans appeal did not exist. Therefore, admitting 
the evidence would bring disrepute on the administration of justice. Peterson's appeal 
was allowed and his conviction for possessing marijuana for the purpose of trafficking 
was set aside. 
8 
UNIVERSITY SECURITY PERSONNEL DISCOVERING 
STOLEN PROPERTY IN DORMITORY ROOM - APPLICATION 
OF CHARTER -ARE THESE PERSONNEL AGENTS OF THE STATE? 
REGINA v. FITCH - Court of Appeal for BC, Victoria V01852, September 1994. 
The accused rented a room from a BC University in the student residency building. He 
defaulted on his rent and the university security police were alerted to carry 01,Jt a 
routine procedure in these circumstances. The security person is to knock on the door 
and if there is no answer he/she enters the room with a master key to determine if the 
defaulter still resides there. As the security person W. opened the door it became 
apparent that someone occupied the room. He, however, saw in clear view, university 
equipment on which he had taken a theft report a few days before. The trial judge 
found that when W. did enter the room the items were not visible from the door. 
The next day another university security person was sent to check the room. He also 
did not get an answer to his knocking on the accused's door and did enter the room. 
He spotted items in addition to those mentioned in W. 's report that were owned by the 
university. Out of "curiosity and nosiness" this second security person opened the 
drawer under the bed and saw a number of camera lenses and physics lasers. The 
supervisor did call the police. 
The police officers who attended entered the room with university security personnel 
and were shown the collection of stolen property. Consequently the officers obtained a 
search warrant and some three hours after their warrantless entry they conducted a 
detailed search of the accused's room. 
In the early morning hours of the following day one of the police officers conducted a 
warrantless inspection of the room. He had received information that someone had 
been in the room during the night. As a result of what he found he obtained a second 
search warrant that authorized a search of the room on the previous day. Not having 
noticed the error in the warrant, the officer searched the room and seized a number of 
items. 
These events raised, of course, some questions under the Charter provisions, such as: 
1. The Charter only applies to government agents and university personnel are not 
necessarily such agents; 
2. Was the search by security person W. a search and if so was it reasonable 
under s. 8 of the Charter? After all his findings were fundamental to what 
followed; 
3. Was the search by the second security the next day reasonable and was he at 
that time an agent of the Crown acting in its prosecutorial interest? 
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4. Was the subsequent warrantless action by the police appropriate. Did they 
conduct a search and were the seizures with the warrant contaminated with the 
infringements of the accused's rights by university personnel and their own 
warrantless actions, if any? 
The trial judge had held that security person "W' had minimally intruded and that the 
purpose of his entry have been for a legitimate purposes to determine if the defaulting 
tenant had abandoned the room. This had not amounted to an unreasonable search. 
The search of the second security person the following day was clearly to investigate a 
criminal activity on campus. He acted for the university but also as an agent for the 
Crown. That search should have been conducted with a warrant and was consequently 
unreasonable and a breach of the accused's rights under s. 8 of the Charter. 
The search by the police officers was also unreasonable. The seizure of the stolen 
goods with the warrant was on the basis of what was discovered by unreasonable 
searches. It is trite law that a warrant cannot remedy an infringement of a right to be 
secure against unreasonable searches that were conducted earlier.4 However, the trial 
judge had admitted the stolen property in evidence by applying a decision by the 
Supreme Court of Canada in 1987.5 Admitting the evidence did not affect the fairness 
of the trial. The evidence was "real" and therefore distinct from evidence that would not 
have existed but for a Charter breach. Consequently the accused had been convicted 
of four counts of possession of stolen property. He appealed these convictions to the 
Court of Appeal for BC. 
The arguments in the Court of Appeal took an interesting twist. The Crown argued that 
the accused's Charter rights had not been infringed. He submitted that the university 
security personnel are not agents of the state and accordingly the Charter does not 
apply to them (sees. 31 Charter). They acted in the private sphere as agents for the 
university in the role of renting living space to students. The BC Court of Appeal 
agreed and held that there was no proper evidence that 
" ..... those employed to provide security for large, publicly funded 
institutions, such as a university, take on the mantle of state agents by 
reason of the character of their employer and the nature of their duties." 
Neither were the security personnel and the local police in tandem with each other 
despite the fact that by the attendance of the second security officer entering and 
searching the room had for all intents and purposes embarked on a criminal 
investigation before involving the local police. 
4 
5 
10 
Regina v. Kokesch (1990) 61 C.C.C. (3d) 207 -Volume 39, page 6 of this publication (Supreme 
Court of Canada) 
Collins v. the Queen 33 C.C.C (3d) 1 - Volume 27, page 1 of this publication. 
The Court held that there was nothing legally amiss when the security person "W' 
checked the room. It was at this stage that the local police should have been alerted 
and from what "W' had observed police could have obtained a search warrant. 
However, as regrettable as it was that this was not done, not at any time was security 
personnel agents of the police nor did police have them do anything "resembling a 
finesse of the Charter" that they could not do to assist police in their prosecutorial 
interest. 
N.o.m: 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
In fulfilling its education and research function in our society, under an Act of the 
prov~nce, the university is an agent of the state. This has been so held by our Courts in 
personnel disputes involving universities. The BC Court of Appeal being cognizant of 
that fact held that despite that being the case not every action of an university 
employee is that of the state agent. 
The reasons for judgment clearly indicate that when the local police become involved 
they were taken into the accused's room and shown the university's property that had 
been reported stolen. This warrantless search resulted in a "seize" warrant being 
issued in that in essence the "searching" had already taken place before the judicial 
licence to do so had been issued. In certain circumstances this is appropriate but in 
this case, the trial judge held the practice to be unconstitutional. The local police 
officers had clearly joined the state in its prosecutorial interest and were its agents. For 
the purpose of the warrant the police pre-warranted entry was superfluous implied the 
Court of Appeal as they had sufficient grounds for a warrant even at the stage that "W' 
had seen the goods on the first "there is nothing wrong with" entry. 
Somehow the matter seems to be left unresolved at the appeal level. At least the 
reasons for judgment do not indicate any reference to this except the trial judges' 
findings. 
11 
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"DETENTION" WHEN QUESTIONING 'SUSPECT' 
AT SCENE OF MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT 
REGINA v. STANFORD -Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver, CA 0176001, 
September 1994. 
A police officer (A) arrived at the scene of a motor vehicle accident. There was one car 
involved with two occupants. One person was in very serious condition and would 
probably die and indeed, did die shortly after. The other occupant of the car was in the 
back of an ambulance. There was an odour of liquor about him and the officer 
suspected that he might be the driver of the car. He asked that simple question, 
"Where you driving the car?" The answer was "Yes". 
A second police officer (8) arrived on the scene shortly after this. Officer A told him that 
the driver of the car was in the ambulance. Officer 8 went there and asked the same 
question and he received the same answer. Officer 8 went through a series of 
questions and steps to identify that person as the driver of the car and he succeeded in 
assuring himself that he was. 
The driver, the accused, was convicted of impaired driving causing death and 
dangerous driving causing death. He appealed these convictions arguing that all the 
evidence officers A and 8 gathered to prove he drove the car was inadmissible due to 
his right to counsel having been violated. His admissions that he had been the driver 
were obtained while he was detained and he should have been told firstly that he had 
right to a lawyer to receive counsel. Although the Court had found that the accused 
was "mobile", in other words his injuries were not such that he could not have walked 
away from the ambulance, he, the accused, claimed that the circumstances rendered 
him to be a detainee. 
This was also based on the officers conceding that they would not have allowed the 
accused to walk away had he chosen to do so. 
When the first officer spoke to the accused, he was sitting up in the ambulance. Officer 
A had not entered the ambulance or asked the accused for identification. He had 
simply asked the accused if he was the driver. When officer 8 interviewed the accused 
he had entered the ambulance and the accused was laying on a stretcher. In essence 
the same thing was established; the accused admitted to having been the driver. 
The trial judge had held that the accused was not detained when either Officer A or 
Officer B questioned him, as someone who might prove to be the person who 
committed an offence. That does not cause detention to occur. Even if the accused 
had been confined to a hospital bed to receive medical treatment, this does not give 
rise to the constraints the Charter refers to when dealing with detention. The reasons 
13 
why he could not leave were medical and not legal. Hence there was no detention and 
the admissions were properly admitted at trial held the Court of Appeal for BC. 
14 
Appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
DISTURBING A RELIGIOUS MEETING -
CHARTER OF RIGHTS - FREEDOM OF RELIGION -
MEANING OF "MEETING" AND "DISTURB" 
REGINA v. REED - Court of Appeal for BC, Victoria, V01773 / V01871 -August 
1994. 
Section 176 of the Criminal Code makes it an offence to wilfully disturb or interrupt an 
assemblage of persons (two or more) meeting for religious worship. or to wilfully do 
anything that disturbs the order or solemnity of such a meeting. This section, despite 
its proximity to the offence of creating a disturbance in a public place, is in nearly all 
respects distinct and autonomous. 
Mr. Reed, the accused, was once a Jehovah Witness. He disagreed with some 
theological doctrines to such a fierce extent that he was expelled from the Assembly. 
Ever since then, Mr. Reed has been before the Courts in regards to his activities in 
public, to bring his views to the attention of Jehovah Witnesses as they attend their 
conventions and worship services.6 
In this case Mr. Reed stood in front of the entrance door to a Kingdom Hall with 
placards. The words he spoke to the congregation members who approached and 
those written on the placards, were considered offensive to the Jehovah Witnesses. 
Most members wanted to avoid Mr. Reed and as his position at the door was such that 
they had to go by him, they entered the Hall through a back door. The evidence 
showed that the socializing, prayer and silent contemplation in preparation for the 
service itself were disrupted, interfered with or did not take place, due to Mr. Reed's 
actions. 
Mr. Reed appealed his two count conviction under s. 176 C.C. to the Court of Appeal 
for BC and argued: 
1. that he had not disturbed a worship service as the service had not yet 
commenced when he stood in front of the door; 
2. that his behaviour had not amounted to a disturbance; and 
3. that the offence section did not comply with the Charter and was therefore of no 
force or effect. 
The Court of Appeal held that at the time of the accused's actions at the door of the 
Kingdom Hall there was a "meeting" in progress thats. 176 C.C. protects from being 
6 Some of the cases have been reported. What is noticeable is that Mr. Reed has an amazing 
record of acquittals. See Volume 44, page 30 of this publication. 
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disturbed. Testimony clearly showed that the period prior to the formal ceremony is one 
of quiet contemplation and prayer. The Court rejected the accused's argument and 
held that "the sanction of s. 176 C.C. began when two or more members of the 
congregation were diverted from the entrance of the Kingdom Hall to the side door". 
Whether the accused's actions did disturb the solemnity of the meeting was a more 
difficult question as the precedents on this point are not too clear. The Court observed 
that the allegation against the accused is "wilfully disturbing the order or solemnity of a 
religious assemblage". There is in law a considerable distinction between the verb 
"disturb" and the noun "disturbance". When a person "disturbs" a meeting he I she 
does not necessarily create a "disturbance". The former occurs in terms of escalation, 
long before the latter. 
The defence conceded that Mr. Reed's behaviour may have annoyed and caused 
emotional discomfort to the congregation members but it did not "disturb" the meeting. 
This, as the Supreme Court said in 1985,7 that a conviction under s. 176 C.C. cannot 
be founded on an accused having caused annoyance, anxiety or emotional upset in the 
members of a congregation during a religious worship, "where the impugned acts are 
brief, essentially passive and peaceful in nature and are voluntary desisted from upon 
request.. .. " Needless to say Mr. Reed had not desisted and yet had caused emotional 
upset. 
Mr. Reed argued that his purpose was distinct from those who had been convicted 
under this section before. He likened himself to Martin Luther the reformer who 
protested the ways of Catholic Church and nailed his ninety some odd articles on the 
cathedral door. He was at the Kingdom Hall not to disturb the meeting, but to make his 
former fellow believers aware of their straying. He had a conscientious duty to deliver 
his message. How can religious dissent be a crime in a nation that guarantees 
freedoms in this regard, argued the accused. 
Although this argument seems valid on the surface it must not be forgotten the most 
freedoms (including the freedom of religion) are protected to the extend that the 
manifestations of those freedoms do not injure the parallel freedoms of others. The 
accused had disturbed a religious meeting the trial judge had found and the Court of 
Appeal agreed. 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Convictions upheld 
NQm: Also see R. v. Reed -Volume 44, page 30 of this publication. 
7 Stoke - Graham et al v. The Queen [1985) 1 S.C.R. 106; 17 C.C.C. (3d} 289. 
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WHO ADDRESSES THE JURY TEST? 
FAIRNESS OF TRIAL 
REGINA v. GUYATT- BC Supreme Court-Vancouver, CC 941195, September 
1994. 
It has always been considered an advantage to address the jury last. The party who 
gets to put his/her case to the jury last is considered to be most influential and counts 
on having made an impression that is freshest on the jury's mind when a verdict is 
considered. Also the party who presents his I her case last has an opportunity to 
counteract, rebut or negate any point the opposition has made. 
The rule has generally been that if the accused person testifies, the defence loses the 
right to address the jury last. In addition s. 651 (3) of the Criminal Code specifies that 
where, "no witnesses are examined for an accused he or his counsel is entitled to 
address the jury last". 
The accused charged with a criminal offence (not disclosed in the reasons for 
judgment) challenged these provisions in law for their constitutional propriety under the 
presumption of innocence and s. 7 of the Charter. He reasoned that for him to make a 
full answer and defence he had the right to address the jury last. In a fair system the 
accused person has the right to make a full answer and defence. That means that the 
accuser calls evidence and the accused has the right to put up a defence. That 
fairness must also be reflected in the sequence in which the jury is addressed by the 
parties in a criminal dispute, argued the defence. 
The Supreme Court trial judge agreed and declared s. 651 (3) of the Criminal Code to 
be without any force or effect. 
It is interesting to note that when a number of war crimes were alleged against leaders 
of the Third Reich in the wake of World War II in the historic trials of Nuremberg, the 
American prosecutor suggested that the prosecution should speak last. The Russian 
prosecutor had objected and expressed surprise. He had "never heard of such an 
unjust procedure". 
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THE MENS REA REQUIREMENTS FOR 
THREATENING DEATH OR SERIOUS BOPIL Y HARM 
REGINA v. CLEMENTE - [1994] 2. S.C.R. 758 -JULY, 1994. 
The accused was told by social worker Ms. D that his file would be returned to his 
previous social worker M. He had become very angry and threatened that he would 
take a shotgun to Ms. M's office and blow it up. He also demonstrated by gestures how 
he would strangle M. A few days later he warned how M's dead body would be found 
in her office. Later he repeated these and like threats by telephone. He was convicted 
under s. 264.1 C.C. and eventually appealed this verdict to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (S.C.C.). The sole issue was the mens rea requirement for uttering a threat or 
causing someone to receive threats that serious bodily harm or death will be caused. 
The accused argued that the Crown must show that the words were uttered to 
intimidate or instill fear. The Crown rebutted that it is enough when it is proven that the 
threat was uttered with the intent to be taken seriously. The Manitoba Court of Appeal 
had unanimously agreed with the accused's opinion on the required intent and the 
majority of that Court had found that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial 
judge's finding that the offence had been made out. 
The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with both the Crown and defence versions of the 
mens rea requirements under this section. A serious threatto kill or cause serious 
bodily harm is inevitably uttered to intimidate or instill fear. Conversely, a threat uttered 
with the intent to intimidate and cause fear must have been said with intent to be taken 
seriously. Either formulation is adequate to show the required mens rea under s. 264.1 
C.C. 
The section protects the exercise of freedom of choice by preventing intimidation. 
Therefore the crime is complete as soon as the threat intended to be taken seriously, 
has been uttered. Based on this the trial judge's finding of guilt was correct. 
The trial judge had also reasoned that a requirement to support a guilty verdict was that 
the accused had intended the threats uttered to Ms. D to be passed on to Ms. M, the 
intended victim. He had inferred such intent from the evidence. The S.C.C. 
emphasized that the uttering of a threat is the offence. It is not a necessary element of 
the crime that it was intended to be passed on to the intended victim. 
The actus reus is the uttering of the threat; the mens rea is "that the words be spoken 
or written as a threat to cause death or serious bodily harm; that is, they were meant to 
intimidate QI be taken seriously. 
Accused's appeal dismissed. 
Conviction upheld 
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DANGEROUS DRIVING - MENS REA -
DRIVER FALLING ASLEEP 
REGINA v. JACKSON -Court of Appeal for BC, Vancouver CA018130 
The accused was following another car on a two laned highway. The lanes were 
separated by a double solid line where the cars approached the brow of a hill. The 
accused drove into the left hand lane designated for opposite traffic, and apparently 
made an attempt to drive onto the left shoulder of the road when an oncoming car 
appeared over the hill. This car collided with the right front of the accused's car. The 
driver of the oncoming car succumbed to the injuries she sustained. The accused was 
consequently convicted of dangerous driving causing death. He appealed this 
conviction to the Court of Appeal for BC. 
The accused had testified that he had obviously strayed in the left hand lane as he had 
no intention to overtake the car in front of him. In term of recalling the details leading 
up to the accident his mind was a total blank. All he recalled was ''waking up" when 
seeing the on-coming vehicle. He had then taken instinctive evasive action. He 
obviously implied that he had fallen asleep and had consequently ended up in the 
wrong lane. 
Dangerous driving is a criminal offence with a prison term liability. The accused argued 
that the trial judge's instructions to the jury that they did not have to consider his intent 
to drive dangerously, was in violation of s 7 of the Charter. This section clearly 
indicates that an offence with prison sentence liability has a form of criminal intent as an 
essential element. In other words an objective test alone will not suffice to find that a 
person drove dangerously. 
In the Hundal8 decision the Supreme Court of Canada found in essence (as recently at 
March 1993) that due to the mayhem created on our highways an objective test is all 
that is required to convict a person of criminal driving offences. However, that test is "a 
modified objective test" held our highest court. The Court gave a number of examples 
that were supposed to explain the modification of the test. These examples were not 
too helpful as all described involuntary acts, such as heart attacks and seizures that 
occurred unexpectedly. However, falling asleep belongs to that category argued the 
defence, and considering the accused's testimony that is the only explanation for him 
inadvertently ending up on the wrong side of the road. 
"Sudden and unexpected onset of sleep is a human frailty of the kind 
referred to by the Supreme Court of Canada" 
argued the defence. 
8 See R.v. Hundal, a decision by the Supreme Court of Canada on this very issue, for a more 
detailed explanation. Volume 44, Page 1 of this publication - 79 C.C.C. (3d) 97. 
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The Crown conceded that if the jury had ~ccepted the accused's version of the accident 
he was entitled to an acquittal. He testified that when he woke up he found himself on 
the wrong side of the road and confronted by an oncoming car. He explained not to 
have pulled back in his own lane as he knew it would be occupied and he therefore had 
attempted to reach the shoulder of the oncoming lane. That testimony was a statement 
of his intentions. However, the jury returned a verdict of guilty and obviously, 
considering the instruction they received on this point, did not believe his explanation. 
The defence, in addition, pointed out that the accused testified that he had not intended 
to pass the car in front of him and he was not on the wrong side of the road for that 
purpose. That, in the circumstances, would have been a marked departure from any 
normal standard of care. 
The BC Court of Appeal disagreed with the Crown's concession that if the jury would 
have believed the accused had fallen asleep he should have been acquitted. Neither 
the offence section nor the Hundal precedent support that view. The Court also 
disagreed with the defence position that the trial judge had not adequately addressed 
the jury on the significance of the accused's testimony in regard to what he had 
intended. As they were, the instructions the judge gave were "favourable, indeed, 
overly favourable" to the accused. The jury was told that if they believed the accused 
he was entitled to an acquittal. 
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Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
STOPPING "STRANGERS" IN WAKE OF ARMED ROBBERY 
SEARCHING THEM WITH CONSENT - DETENTION -
ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE 
REGINA v. R.G.H.H. - BC Supreme Court, No. VOA 3484, Kamloops, October 1994. 
An armed robbery occurred in a smaller community in the BC interior. Police were on 
the look out for strangers and suspects. The accused youth was found hitchhiking "late 
morning" the day following the robbery, on the highway some two kilometres outside the 
community. He was in the company of another youth "D". 
A police officer spotted the duo and asked them for identification and used his radio for 
a CPIC check. The officer in charge of the robbery investigation heard the inquiry and 
attended at the scene. He searched the backpack of "D" and found a large quantity of 
marijuana. He then turned to the accused youth and asked if he was "carrying 
anything". "No man" was the reply and he opened the zipper of his waist pouch while 
inviting the officer to take a look for himself. The officer asked the accused to confirm 
his consent and did search him, finding a small quantity of marijuana. Both youths 
were arrested for possession of a narcotic. The accused youth appealed his 
consequential conviction to the BC Supreme Court claiming that: 
1. police had no grounds to stop and search him; 
2. the first officer had no authority to hold him until the investigator arrived; 
3. he had been detained without cause; 
4. there were no grounds for the search; and, consequently 
5. the evidence (marijuana) should have been excluded. 
The Supreme Court Justice rejected all the accused's arguments. In the circumstances 
the accused had not been physically or psychologically detained before he was 
arrested. He had invited the search and confirmed the consent to search his waist 
pouch. 
Should I be wrong, the Justice said, the real evidence of marijuana should be admitted 
as doing so would not cause the administration of justice to be brought into disrepute. 
Appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
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RIGHT TO COUNSEL - CANADIAN INVESTIGATORS 
INTERVIEWING A U.S. SUSPECT IN HIS OWN COUNTRY 
- PROTOCOL AND ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OBTAINED -
REGINA v. COOK - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC 940075, September 1994. 
The accused, an ex US marine, had frequented the BC Lower Mainland when he was 
stationed on Whidbey Island off the state of Washington Coast. 
A taxi driver was robbed and murdered when the accused was on one of these jaunts 
into BC and he became a suspect. Police had sufficient evidence for a provisional 
warrant for the accused's arrest and the Crown commenced extradition applications. 
Two days after a US Federal Marshal executed the warrant in Louisiana two police 
investigators traveled to New Orleans to interview the accused in regards to the murder. 
Eventually the accused · was tried for murder in British Columbia Supreme Court and the 
conversation the two officers had with the accused became subject to a voire dire to 
determine its admissibility. Between the "Miranda" warning the Marshall had given the 
accused and the abundant assurances by the officers, that he, the accused was in 
charge and could, if he would be uncomfortable "with what is going on here," say 'sorry 
boys that's its, I'm out of here" .... and can just go right back and climb into your bed". 
He was assured by these words: "You Jealize you don't have to talk to us", that he had 
a right to remain silent. Although the means were somewhat unorthodox compared to 
the official warning, the accused was, as the transcript of the lengthy interview 
indicated, quite adequately informed of his right to remain silent. The statements the 
accused made were uttered voluntarily. 
However, the admissibility test under the Charter did not fare as well for the Crown. 
Particularly the "right to counsel" issue became an obstacle. About 20 minutes into the 
interview one of the Canadian officers said to the accused," .... there's a couple of 
things I got to tell you here". After assuring the accused that due to the respect the 
military and the police have for each other "I'm not going to screw you around", he said, 
" .... You have the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. And that means 
basically, and I realize that probably means nothing, .... you can talk to somebody, get 
advice." The officer then went on to explain the meaning of "counsel" (as it was applied 
under the Bill of Right (1960), prior to the Charter coming into effect in 1982). He said 
that he could talk to a lawyer, but that counsel means anybody - confidant, a religious 
leader or someone the person respects. (See comment for explanation). 
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In the wake of assurances to the accused that they would be "up front" with him, the 
officer asked the accused to explain how his fingerprints came to be on the crime 
scene, while this was not the case. The Court held that this technique at that stage of 
the interview, indicated that there was no intention to be "up front" with the accused. A 
falsehood like this does not render a statement inadmissible as it does not affect the 
voluntariness of the response, held the Court. However, it does affect the tenor, sphere 
and mood of the interview. 
What complicated the matter of right to counsel was the failure of the US Federal 
Magistrate before whom the accused appeared to arrange for a local lawyer to be 
appointed for him. He had been promised counsel to represent him and to give him the 
advice he wanted and had asked for. By the time the Canadian police officers arrived 
at the gaol where he was held, the lawyer promised him had not yet shown up. The 
Canadian officers were unaware of all this and had made no inquiries in this regard. 
The Court was seemingly quite critical that Canadian authorities on US soil, 
investigating a US citizen, did not inquire before interviewing him what he had been told 
in terms of his rights in the US, whether or not he was represented by counsel, if he had 
exercised any of his rights. In other words to familiarize themselves with the accused's 
status within the US system this the Court held, was their "positive duty". In addition to 
that they did not tell the accused of his right to counsel or his right to remain silent until 
they were about 20 minutes into the interview. The questions asked during these 20 
minutes were not all within the rubic of "background". Some questions related directly 
to whether or not the accused was involved in the murder. 
In addition to the above references the officer made to the accused's right to counsel. 
he did say later that they could arrange for him to speak, free of charge, to a BC lawyer 
for advice and how he could obtain a BC lawyer's service, also for free, to represent 
him in Canada. All of this advise was so shrouded in irrelevant information that it 
became potentially confusing and distracting. The Court found that: 
" ... the Charter advice given by the officer in the manner he chose to give 
it deprived the accused of the opportunity to make an informed choice· 
about talking to the police without obtaining legal advice." 
The references that the right to counsel "probably means nothing" and that counsel 
includes confidants and spiritual advisors, were found to be "misleading". The advice 
intended to be made available is legal advice. Furthermore, there should have been 
"an immediate" offer to put the accused in touch with a BC lawyer by telephone. He 
was not specifically made aware that such an opportunity was available to him. The 
Court held that where a police officer does not choose to use the printed warning card 
and its precise language, he or she must when informing a detainee of his I her rights 
be clear, business-like and above all accurate. The Court concluded that absent an 
explanation, it was justified to infer that the officers "intended the results obtained". The 
deliberate delay in making the accused aware of his rights and the misleading question 
about his fingerprints having been found on the scene support that conclusion, 
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reasoned the Court. The trial judge found that the statements from the accused were 
obtained as a result of a breach of the accused's right to counsel. Whether or not 
admitting those statements would bring the administration of justice into disrepute 
would be decided later in the trial. 
Comment: 
These reasons for judgment say very little about the content of the statements. It 
mentions that on two occasion the accused denied any involvement in the murder. 
However, the judge's observation that police "intended the results they obtained" 
implied that the statement was also incuplatory. 
Explanation: 
Under the Bill of Rights (1960) counsel did not necessarily exclusively mean a lawyer. 
The purpose of s. 2 (c) (i.i) of the Bill of Rights was to guarantee that no statute or "no 
law" of Canada (not including those of the provinces) would be so construed or applied 
so as to deprive a detained person of his I her right to retain and instruct counsel 
without delay. 
It was assumed that a person was aware of his rights and there was no obligation on 
the part of the authorities to inform or remind the detained person of any rights. The 
warning of silence was given to assist in proving the voluntariness of any utterances by 
the detainee so as to render them admissible in evidence as proof of the truth of their 
content. This warning was not obligatory and not given to inform the detainee of a right 
to silence. In a sense the warning was self-serving on the part of the person in 
authority. 
The Bill of Rights guaranteed a right to counsel, but not a right to be made aware of it. 
It was not only a guarantee to legal advice should the detainee who was aware of that 
right want to exercise, it also prevented anyone from being detained ex-communicado 
and indeed the Courts did at times reason that who the detainee sought counsel from 
was exclusively his I her business. 
Until the "Miranda" decision by the US Supreme Court there did exist no right for a 
detainee to be made aware of his I her rights. The Miranda precedent placed a 
responsibility on the authorities, including the judiciary, that a detained person or one in 
jeopardy is made aware of his I her rights at each stage of the criminal process. This is 
very noticeable in the US Courts where judges will ensure that those who appear 
before them, whether represented by counsel or not, are aware of their rights at this 
juncture of the process. Investigative authorities "Miranda" their detainees to avoid the 
consequences of the strict exclusionary rule in many states. 
In Canada no such precedent exists and no such explicit provision is included in the 
Charter. Our constitution provides that only one right Is brought to the attention of 
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every detainee as soon as possible and that is the right to counsel. Our Supreme Court 
of Canada has repeatedly held and implied that the right to counsel is the detainee's 
access to all his I her rights and options in the criminal process. Our approach to every 
detained person being aware of his I her rights at all stages of the process is by means 
of the guaranteed right to counsel and the right to be so informed. What is 
accomplished by the Miranda principle in the US, is in Canada met by our approach to 
right to counsel. It, in essence, is the pearly gate to all rights and options. 
Consequently counsel means legal counsel. 
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ROADSIDE SOBRIETY TEST AND STATEMENTS BY THE 
SUSPECT REGARDING HIS DRINKING BEFORE AND 
DURING THE TEST - RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
REGINA v. MOBLEY - BC Supreme Court, Vancouver CC930850, October, 1994. 
In 1987 the BC Court of Appeal held that a person undergoing a roadside sobriety test 
is detained and entitled to right to counsel and to be made aware of that right. 9 In 1989, 
the BC Court of Appeal reversed that decision 10 and held (consistent with precedents 
set by their counterparts in other provinces) that to elevate suspicion to reasonable and 
probable ground so demands for breath samples can be made, the right to counsel is 
suspended for the duration of a roadside sobriety test. The evil of impaired driving is so 
great that this suspension of that right is demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society (S. 1 of the Charter). 
The Ontario Court of Appeal had already in 198811 provided for the suspension of 
counsel to accommodate a roadside sobriety test. However it held also that if an officer 
intends to question a suspect in regards to this consumption of alcohol or seek any 
other inculpatory statement during this test, then the right to counsel is not suspended. 
In this case the accused was stopped for erratic driving. The officer asked if he had 
been drinking before, during and after the roadside sobriety test. Each time the officer 
received inculpatory answers. After this the demand for breath samples was made and 
the accused was then told of his right to counsel. 
The trial judge had disallowed the inculpatory answers by the accused in evidence and 
held that without them the officer still had the reasonable and probable grounds to 
make the demand. The accused was convicted of "over 80" and appealed this 
conviction to the B.C. Supreme Court. He claimed the questions he was asked, the 
inculpatory answers the accused gave and the sobriety test were inseparable and 
made one whole that formed the grounds for the demand. 
The Supreme Court Justice disagreed with the defense position. The officer had 
testified that once he saw the accused swaying he knew he was impaired. When he 
observed the accused doing the balancing test he was completely persuaded that there 
were grounds to make a demand. The trial judge had reviewed the subjective belief of 
the officer and applied an objective standard test to that evidence, absent the 
statements, and had found the officer did have adequate grounds to make the demand. 
9 
10 
11 
Regina v. Bonogofski - BCCA, CC007 - Volume 29, page 1 of this publication. 
Regina v. Bonin - BCCA, CC008998, Volume 34, page 1 of this publication. 
Regina v. Saunders - 41 C.C.C. (3d) 532 
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Appeal was dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
The Crown took the position that in R. v. CHU (1989 CA009343) the B.C. Court of 
Appeal extended the Bonin (supra) decision to include the statements by the accused 
regarding his/her consumption of alcohol made before or during the sobriety test. The 
Supreme Court Justice did say that this was not clear enough to him to confirm the 
Crown's claim. 
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WHAT MENS REA IS REQUIRED TO PROVE ON ABDUCTION 
OF A CHILD UNDER THE AGE OF FOURTEEN BY A PERSON OTHER THAN 
PARENTS - MEANING OF THE WORDS "UNLAWFULLY TAKES" 
REGINA v. CHARTRAND - [1994] Supreme Court [of Canada] Reports. 864. 
March 1994. 
The accused, a 43 year old man, was hitting golf balls in a soccer field of a schoolyard. 
Eight year old Tyler A. and two of his neighbourhood friends arrived on the field to play. 
The accused became involved in their play upon the initiative of these boys. After the 
novelty wore off, the accused and Tyler remained in the school yard and the two 
friends left to buy refreshments. When they returned they could at first not locate Tyler 
but found him later in a wooded area of the school yard where the accused was taking 
pictures of Tyler. As the friends interfered with the picture taking they were asked to 
leave; As that did not work the accused and Tyler ran from the boys but they caught 
up. When the accused made a serious attempt for the boys to " .. .leave us alone", the 
friends bargained and promised they would if one of them could steer the accused's car 
around the school yard. The boy sat on the accused's lap to do so. · The friends left the 
car and in the process overheard the accused proposing to Tyler to go to a location with 
him that was along a river about 3 km away. The friends advised Tyler in vain not to go 
with the accused. 
The friends told one of their parents who in turn told Tyler's dad what had happened. 
Police were alerted and after a 90 minute search Tyler's dad found the accused taking 
pictures of his son wearing the accused's sweater. When asked by Tyler's father what 
he was doing with his son the accused said he had intended to surprise him and his 
wife with pictures of Tyler. 
The accused was charged with "unlawfully" taking a child under the age of fourteen 
away from the custody of the parents (s. 281.C.C.). The accused argued that he had 
not "unlawfully" taken Tyler. The boy had come on his own accord. No unlawful act did 
take place in taking the boy out for a ride and picture taking session. It may have at 
best been irresponsible, but not unlawful. The Ontario trial court and Court of Appeal 
agreed and the accused's acquittal was appealed by the Crown to the Supreme Court 
of Canada. The Ontario Courts had labeled the accused's actions as "socially . 
inappropriate", reprehensible and annoying, but nonetheless, the Crown had failed to 
show it was done with the intent to deprive Tyler's parents of their custody of the boy. 
The heart of the dispute between the Crown and the accused was the mens rea 
requirement ins. 281. 
The Supreme Court of Canada noted a distinction between the abduction by parents 
and by persons "not being the parents" of a child. In the former the word "unlawfully" is 
deleted. Other distinctions were explored between kidnapping, hostage taking, 
31 
abduction of a person under the age of 16 years, and abduction of a child under the 
age of 14 years. Only in the latter is the consent of the person taken run a defense. In 
that taking of the person (under the age of 14 years) only the consent of the parents is 
a defense. In other words, in the other offenses of taking persons the person taken is 
the victim. The parents are the victims where a child under 14 years is taken. 
The S.C.C. concluded that under s. 281 C.C. the required intent is to deprive the 
parents of custody rights. Considering that the aim of criminal law is to prevent harm to 
society, s. 281 C.C. must be interpreted with this aim in mind. Consequently the aim of 
this section is to prevent harm to and provide protection of children by means of 
creating this offense against the parents and the guardians of them. Said the Court: 
" ... the abduction of children by strangers is a sad reality and a great 
concern to society: one is too many." 
In view of all this, what does the word "unlawfully" mean in this section 281 C.C.? This 
word in the text of law, must mean what makes that law meaningful in relation to its 
object. Among others it has been held to mean: "without lawful reason or excuse"; 
"without excuse or justification"; "without lawful authority"; "without lawful justification or 
excuse"; etc. The last one was preferred by the Court and found to be suitable and 
befitting the section and its object. The defense argued that "unlawfully" taking the child 
means that besides the taking of the child requires an additional unlawful act. In other 
words, the means by which the child is taken must in itself amount to an unlawful act. 
The Supreme Court of Canada responded that that would be at "cross-purposes with 
the mischief Parliament wanted to cure". 
Often persons who abduct a child do so without violence, observed the Court. 
Furthermore, the requirement that the taking must be unlawful protects people who 
innocently, justifiably have an excuse to take a child out of the control of the parents. 
"Surely the aim and purpose of the section cannot be to convict people 
who have a lawful justification for taking children such as an honourable 
purpose by a good Samaritan." 
However, if the requirement of "unlawfully takes" was placed in s. 281 C.C. exclusively 
for the purpose to protect innocent and good Samaritans, then the provision is 
redundant and superfluous as all those persons would find ample of protection under 
the common law defenses under s. 8 C.C., and authorities who may have to take a 
child from a parent have s. 25 C.C. as a shield. 
Having examined all the interpretations the adverb "unlawfully" has received, and 
considering that it does not appear in the French version of s. 281 C.C., the Court 
concluded the word was "surplusage". 
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Then the Supreme Court of Canada turned to the issue of the intent the Crown must 
show on the part of a person accused under s. 281 C.C. The Court quoted from the 
section that the intent must be to deprive the parent or guardian of the possession of 
the child. The Court affirmed that the intended deprivation needs not to be permanent. 
Furthermore, any withholding of the child is run an element of the offense. Taking or 
enticement must cause the deprivation and not necessarily detention. 
In terms of intent the S.C.C. reiterated the general rule that when we intentionally do 
something with a foreseeable consequence to our act, then we also intended that 
consequence. 
The accused claimed to have had an innocent motive or purpose when he took Tyler 
along. However, that is irrelevant to the issue of intent. Intent, purpose and motive are 
.ru21 one and the same. A motive is the explanation of why we acted and that does not 
necessarily coincide with our intent. In terms of evidence motive is always relevant and 
admissible but is, in Canada, as a matter of law not an essential element to be proven 
by the Crown. 
To put it succinctly, the presence of motive helps the Crown; the absence of it is an 
important fact in favour of the defense; motive may be evidence of intent, however 
proof of motive is not necessary to prove intent. 
The S.C.C. summarized the mens rea requirement for s.281C.C. that it: 
" ... can also be proven by the mere fact of the deprivation of possession of the 
child from the child's parents or guardians through the taking, as long as the trier 
of fact draws an inference that the consequences of that taking are foreseen by 
the accused as a certain or substantially certain result of the taking, 
independently of the purpose or motive for which such taking occurred." 
"In this light, and with the purpose of the section in mind, the intent requirement 
of s. 281 C.C .. must be interpreted so that if a child is in a park or on the street 
with the knowledge or consent of the parents or guardians and therefore within 
the realm of control and possession of the parents or guardians, and is taken, it 
will be rare indeed that the deprivation of a child from the parents or guardians 
was not the intent of the impugned act." 
The accused had taken Tyler with him in his car during which time Tyler's parents were 
unable to contact him or locate him. They had no idea where he was or what was 
being done with him and he was consequently out of the ambit of his parent's control. 
The accused had subjectively "desired to deprive Tyler's parents" of possession 
through the taking or foresaw such an inevitable consequence. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
New trial ordered. 
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JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ASSISTING POLICE IN DRAFTING INFORMATION 
TO OBTAIN SEARCH WARRANT 
REGINA v. HOWE- Court of Appeal for B.C. Vancouver CA017918. December 
1994. 
A police officer drafted an information to obtain a search warrant. He had written that 
an informer found to have been very reliable in the past, had been in the accused's 
home during the past eight hours, told him that there was cocaine in the home. He also 
had written that the home had been watched and it was confirmed that this was the 
house the informer had referred to. The Justice of the Peace had asked the officer if 
any vehicles had been seen coming and going at that address and if that traffic had 
been consistent with drug trafficking. When the officer answered both questions in the 
affirmative, the Justice of the Peace had suggested to add that fact to the information. 
This was done and the warrant was issued. Drugs were found and the trial judge had 
admitted them in evidence. The accused's sole appeal to the Court of Appeal for B.C. 
was that admissibility of the evidence. It was argued that the Justice of the Peace had 
participated inappropriately in the content of the information to obtain a search warrant. 
The addition invalidated the warrant and rendered the search and seizure unreasonable 
under s. 8 of the Charter, claimed defense counsel. 
When questioned in the witness stand what that "consistent" traffic had consisted of, 
the officer said there was one car only, that stayed for 13 minutes, It had been stopped 
and marihuana had been found in the vehicle. This was consistent with street-level 
trafficking, he said. Dealers do not restrict themselves to one kind of drug or narcotic 
only. He could not remember if he had told the Justice ofthe Peace these details. 
The precedent12 the defense relied on to show that the Justice of the Peace had 
abandoned the judicial role when she participated in the drafting of the information was 
distinguishable from this case. Firstly, in 'Gray' the information police suggested was, 
on advice of the Justice of the Peace, completely redrafted. That information was 
originally inadequate for a Justice of the Peace to issue a search warrant. He had 
advised them how to make it adequate. In this case, there was only one sentence 
added with a content that did make the information stronger but did not alter it from 
being inadequate for its purpose to being adequate. 
The defense argued that the last sentence implies that there was continuous traffic of 
cars coming and going with the occupants staying short periods of time. The officer's 
testimony disclosed that there was one car only. Hence, when he swore the 
information he misled the Justice of the Peace. It was not misleading, held the Court of 
Appeal for B.C ... 
12 Regina v. Gray - 81 C.C.C. (3d) 174. 
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" ... since one cannot expect precise prose or detailed disclosures in these 
circumstances." 
The overall conduct of the officer had shown good faith on his part. Furthermore, the 
admission of real evidence needed to prove essential elements of serious crimes does 
not bring disrepute on the administration of justice. 
The appeal was dismissed 
Conviction upheld. 
It is clear from the two concurring reasons for judgment in this case that the Court of 
Appeal for B:C. unanimously agrees with their Manitoba counterpart that collaboration 
on the part of a Justice of the Peace in the content of information is an abandonment of 
the Judicial role. The proceedings are not formal, in camera, and ex parte (not in the 
presence of the person (s) affected). It is the Judicial role to determine if these are 
reasonable and probable grounds on the part of the deponents to issue a judicial 
license to invade the most private places of citizens who are guaranteed a right to be 
secure against unreasonable· search and seizure by means of an .entrenched 
constitution. A private tete-a-tete with that judicial person lending a helping hand on 
what may make the cheese more binding, is hardly giving the appearance of 
impartiality. 
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PROCEDURAL CHANGES REGARDING 'DIRECTED VERDICTS' 
AS MATTERS OF LAW TO A JURY 
REGINA v. ROWBOTHAM and ROBLIN - [1994] 2. S.C.R. 463. 
At common law, a judge who finds that there is no evidence upon which a jury may 
return a verdict of guilty, must direct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. He or she 
is not allowed to enter that verdict and by-pass the jury. This despite the fact that the 
judge is in charge of the law and the jury determines the facts. No evidence is a point 
of law while insufficient evidence is a point of fact. This procedure would not be 
problematic if juries were not independent and need not to comply with a "directed 
verdict" instruction from the trial judge. 
In this case a no evidence motion succeeded and there was nothing for the jury to 
decide. "As a matter of law" the judge said to the jury, "you must return a verdict of not 
guilty." The jury returned with questions instead of a verdict. They wanted to know why 
they sat in the courtroom for over four weeks and in the end find there is nothing for 
them to decide. Furthermore, some jurors having understandable problems grasping 
the distinction between factual guilt and legal innocence, felt the accused persons 
should be convicted. The jury did obey the instruction the judge gave them and 
seemingly reluctantly returned a verdict of not guilty but not after one juror commented: 
"In a way it's been a bit of a waste". 
The Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) exclusively dealing with this procedural issue, 
found that it was overdue to make changes to this common law provision. The old 
procedures were implemented to avoid Judicial abuse of authority. This is no longer 
relevant observed the Court. The Court concluded: 
" ... that the common law procedure with respect to directed verdicts should be 
modified in instances where in the past the trial judge would have directed the 
jury to return a particular verdict. The trial judge should now say 'as a matter of 
law, I am withdrawing the case from you and I am entering the verdict I would 
otherwise direct you to give as a matter of law"'. 
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Comment: 
It appears that these procedural changes include all cases where n:a matter of law 
only one verdict is appropriate. This leads to the inevitable question if this includes 
cases where a verdict of guilty is the only correct verdict as the defense relied on is ~ 
matter of law not available to the accused. 'Morgentaler' juries have received "directed 
verdict" instructions due to the trial judges holding that the common law defense of 
"necessity"13 or the defense of emergent surgical procedures in s.45 of the Criminal 
Code, were not available to Dr. Morgentaler. Juries have, despite directed verdicts, 
returned verdicts of not guilty for procuring miscarriages. 
13 
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Perka, Nelson, Hines, Johnson and The Queen - Supreme Court of Canada, October 1984. See 
Volume 18, page 5 of this publication. 
AVAILABILITY OF INSANITY DEFENCE WHEN ACTING ON 
DISTORTED DELUSIONARY CIRCUMSTANCES. 
REGINA v. OOMEN. - Supreme Court of Canada. 2 S.C.R. 507 [1994]. 
The accused suffering of psychosis of a paranoid delusional type, subjectively believed 
that a labour organizer was planning to take his life. On the evening he murdered a 
woman in his apartment who he had charitably given temporary shelter. He truly but 
mistakenly believed that she was in on the plot against him. He had a neighbour call 
police and he consistently explained that he saw the woman walk by his bedroom with 
a knife in her hand. "Instead of her killing me I went and lowered the gun and I killed 
her". The victim was in her bed when she was shot but was only pretending to be 
asleep, explained the accused. 
The accused was acquitted by a jury after raising the defense of insanity. The Court of 
Appeal for Alberta ordered a new trial on the grounds that the trial judge had erred in 
his interpretation of insanity provisions. The accused appealed that order to the 
Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.). 
The S.C.C. disagreed with the Court of Appeal opinion that where a person who 
normally knows the difference between right and wrong suffers the delusions that 
distort reality and commits a crime in response to that distortion, then he is not entitled 
to an insanity acquittal unless the defense would have been available had the distorted 
scene be real. In other words, if the circumstances in his apartment had been as he 
believed them to be, and had she intended to kill him, he would, as things were, not 
have been entitled to be excused for taking her life. 
The S.C.C., disagreeing with that judicial view, reasoned that had the circumstances in 
fact been as the accused believed they were and had due to his mental disorder 
reacted as he did, deprived of knowing right from wrong, he could have been excused 
for acting as he did. The S.C.C. held therefore that the evidence was capable of 
supporting a conclusion "that the accused was deprived of the capacity to know his act 
was wrong by the standards of the ordinary person". 
Crown's appeal dismissed 
Acquittal upheld 
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TIDBITS 
Admissibility made to undercover officer 
by a person not detained 
The accused was arrested for murder. An undercover officer was placed in his cell but 
nothing was gained by this. The accused was later released and while free, he made 
inculpatory statements to an undercover officer. ·He was convicted for second degree 
murder and appealed that conviction to the Supreme Court of Canada. He argued that 
although he was free at the time he made the statements, he was still the subject of a 
murder charge and therefore those statements were not admissible in evidence. 14 The 
Supreme Court of Canada disagreed and held: 
"We share the view that the accused was not detained within the meaning 
of Hebert and Broyles. Furthermore, the tricks used by police were not 
likely to shock the community or cause the accused's statements not to be 
free and voluntary." 
Accused's appeal dismissed 
Conviction upheld 
REGINA v. MclNTYRE [1994] 2. S.C.R. 480. 
********** 
Cultivation of marijuana on public property 
in plain view of public road - Unreasonable search. 
The accused cultivated marihuana on Crown land in plain sight from an adjacent public 
dirt road. Police walked down that dirt road and saw the plants and seized them. The 
trial judge had ruled that the walk had amounted to a search that was unreasonable. 
The B.C. Court of Appeal reversed that decision and ordered a new trial. The accused 
appealed the order to no avail, to the Supreme Court of Canada. It held like the Court 
of Appeal that the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in respect to the 
area where the marihuana was being cultivated. In the circumstances there was no 
entitlement to the protection of s. 8 of the Charter. 
REGINA v. BOERSMA [1994] 2. 5 C.R. 488. 
Accused's Appeal dismissed 
Order for new trial upheld 
14 Regina v. Hebert - 57 C.C.C. (3d). See Volume 37, page 16 of this publication. 
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The reasons for judgment fail to identify what stage of the search was challenged; the 
walk by the public road or the seizure of the plants. Neither does it say whether the 
investigators obtained a warrant for the seizures. 
********"* 
Intent required for Assault 
Causing Bodily Harm 
The accused was convicted of assault causing bodily harm. As the Crown had failed to 
show that the accused had the intent to cause the harm, the Court of Appeal of New 
Brunswick ordered a new trial. The Crown appealed this order to the Supreme Court of 
Canada (S.C,C.) arguing that no such intent is required. The S.C.C. agreed and 
reiterated their decisions in 199215 and 199316 that the mens rea required is objective 
foresight of bodily harm. 
Crown's appeal allowed 
Conviction restored 
REGINA v. GODIN [1994] 2. S.C.R. 484 
********** 
Flawed Direction to Complainant 
In a photo-line-up, the complainant of an alleged sexual assault was asked by the 
investigating officer: " ... pick out the one who looked most like the person who assaulted 
you". The Court held that the direct and determined testimony of the complainant had 
overcome the flaw contained in that question. The direction the officer gave the 
complainant does cause one to infer that the picture of the suspect is included in the 
photographs shown her This, the. Supreme Court Justice held, is "quite contrary to 
police practice." 
REGINA v. MINH DUNG DOAN. B.C. Supreme Court - Vancouver CC930611 
November, 1994. 
15 
16 
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Regina v. De Sousa [1992] 2 S.C.R. 944. See Volume 43, page 31 of this publication. 
Regina v. Creighton [1993] 3 S.C.R. 3. See Volume 45, page 21 of this publication. 
Is Recanting Perjurous Evidence within the Same Trial 
a Defence to Perjury? 
The accused gave perjurous evidence and recanted that evidence within the same trial. 
He appealed the conviction for perjury claiming that the recantation had negated the 
perjury. The Supreme Court of Canada disagreed with the accused. It held that the 
evidence was given to mislead the trial Court and was clearly falsehood under oath. 
When the evidence was adduced the offense of perjury was complete and the 
recantation did not negate the original intent of the accused to mislead with falsehoods. 
The accused's "good but misguided" notions when he gave the perjurous evidence and 
his change of heart, should be considered favourably in the sentencing process, but it 
did not provide him with a defense. 
REGINA v. ZAZULAK (1994] 2. S.C.R. (5) May 1994. 
********** 
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